Thailand and the Viet Minh League (01)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (01)

Anti-French feeling and the unresolved problem of the disputes territories with the French were the main reasons for Thailand’s alliance with the Vietnamese, its bitter enemy in the pre-colonial era.

Thai decision-makers actively encouraged dissident Vietnamese elements in Thailand, and hoped for a Viet Minh victory in Indo-China, since they considered that this would make the disputed territories fall into their lap.

Both Thais and Vietnamese tried to forget the past and started a new era of friendship with the common objective of destroying French domination in Indo-China.

The Thais allowed the Vietnamese to use Thai territory as a base for their political and military activities against the French. In Battambang in particular the original Vietnamese population consisted for the most part of fishermen on the Great Lake. They were heavily reinforced by two distinct types of dissident Vietnamese from French Indo-China proper.

First there were political refugees and outlaws from Cochin-China (Southern Vietnam), some of course wanted by the French. Many of them belonged to the Viet Minh and a number of them came under Communist influence and had reason to fear and dislike the French.

Secondly, there were Vietnamese from Cambodia, who, after the removal of former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh by the Allies, were relieved of their administrative posts.

This second category worked with the Khmer Issaraks in the hope that they could get their jobs back in an independent Cambodia. Here it is as well to point out that, although the Cambodians were on the whole afraid of the Vietnamese, there were many highly-placed Vietnamese in the pre-October 1945 Cambodian Government. Of the two Vietnamese elements the first was by far the most active and most dangerous to the French.

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (02)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (02)

The President of the Viet Minh Party in Battambang was Thoi, who worked in the local hospital. The Viet Minh Party in communication with the Viet Minh Government in Hanoi and seized every opportunity to make more trouble for the French in Cambodia.

From November 1945 on several hundred armed Vietnamese in Battambang massed along the Cambodia-Thailand border to stop the eventual French advance across the frontier.

Their political leaders and some Japanese deserters met regularly at Battambang with the connivance of the Thai Administrator to foment ant-French and anti-Cambodian(i.e. collaborationist) feeling.

Collections were made amongst the Vietnamese for the support so long as the Vietnamese for the support of the dissident elements and for the purchase of arms. The Thai authorities  in no way hindered such collections so long as the Vietnamese helped them to guard the border. All the French could do at this juncture was to request the British authorities, whose duty was to disarm the Japanese in Battambang, to warn the Thais that such tolerance amounting to complicity might have serious effects.

Despite this warning together with French bellicose statement that they would use force of arms to expel the Thais from that occupied territories, the Thai leaders in Bangkok did not yield; they continued supplying arms and offered training facilities to teach guerrilla tactics to the Vietnamese dissidents throughout the period prior to the Franco-Thai agreement reached in November 1946.

The Vietnamese dissidents were active not only in Battambang but also in Northeastern Thailand where there were around 20,000 long time Vietnamese residents. These refugees of longstanding were joined by a new influx of compatriots from Laos in early 1946.

Viet Minh agents led by Dr Nguyen Duc Qui used these refugees as a source of funds, supplies and recruits. As on the Cambodian front, the Viet Minh armed forces worked together with the Free Laotians and the Thai police force to prevent the French from securing an easy return to the Kingdom of Laos.

The headquarters of the Viet Minh resistance, of which Dr Nguyen Duc Qui was President, in Northeastern Thailand was in Udon Thani province. After the French attack on Thai soil in May 1946, however, the political leaders of the Viet Minh were invited to move to Bangkok, while their armed forces still continued launching raids on French military strongholds across the Mekong River.

Among the Indo-Chinese nationalists, the Vietnamese movement was best organized. In Bangkok, the Viet Minh agents had a variety of political organizations. Their Bangkok headquarters as at Soy Lang-Xuan, one of the centers of old Vietnamese community, with Dr Nguyen Duc Qui and Le Van Nham as President and Vice President respectively.

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (03)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (03)

Besides, the Viet Minh established a Vietnam Government Delegation for South-East Asia with Tran Van Giau as its President. Furthermore, the Viet Minh agents set up the Vietnamese Relief Association on

Nares Road

, Siphraya, and also a headquarters for the purchase of arms.

At that time Bangkok became the co-ordination center for the arms trade, although Manila was the central supply point, not only or Indo-China but for other disturbed areas of South-east Asia.

Seaplanes and fast motor-boats could easily land cargoes on sections of the Thai coast that were either unguarded or not controlled by the Thai Government. From Thailand the arms into the Indo-Chinese Kingdom of Laos and Cambodia, to supply both the forces of the Viett Minh and the Cambodian and Laotians nationalists.

The traffic included automatic weapons, rifles, pistols and grenades. Payment for the bulk of it was made in Indo-Chinese piastres  at the rate of 15 million to 25 million a month. This amounted to 500,000 USD. Most of the equipment was of American manufacture, brought in on American aircraft, by American pilots.

The Viet Minh openly operated a purchasing office for U.S equipment and medical supplies in Bangkok within one block of the local U.S. information Service. Apart from an arms purchasing office, Thailand also allowed the Viet Minh to open the Vietnam News Service in Bangkok. The weekly Vietnam News Bulletin was published there with Le Hi as the editor.

The Viet Minh News Service, apart from speaking for the government of Ho Chi Min’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was the center of Vietnamese Communist activities in Thailand. The man who was responsible for these Communist activities was  Tran Van Giau: a publicly-confessed Communist.

Generally speaking, Thai civilian leaders of the period were willing to afford sanctuary and offer assistance to the various Indo-Chinese resistance groups even though it was felt that some of them adhered to the doctrine of Communism.

Such willingness to offer support was due, on the one hand, to traditional Thai antagonism towards France, which was regarded as a dangerous and threatening power, especially since its controlled indo-China, and on the other hand, to the Thai strategic need for countervailing power against France. As a consequence of their support for the resistance groups Thai strategic interests were furthered in challenging the right to rule of the French in Indo-China.

With the return to power of  Phibunsonggram, Thai foreign policy towards Indo-China changed. An anti-French policy was discarded and replaced by one of reconciliation.

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (04)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (04)

The Vietnamese nationalists in Bangkok suffered first from this change of government. Their houses were searched and their stocks of weapons destined for indo-China seized. The Vietnamese had tried in vain to persuade the Thai military authorities that they would not use the weapons in hostilities against Thailand; instead they would use them to gain freedom and to throw off the French yoke.

As they had helped Thailand including the recruitment of Vietnamese into the Thai Army in the Franco-Thai conflict in 1940-41, they reminded Phibunsonggram of that episode. In reply, the latter, then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, tried to evade the issue by telling the Vietnamese that he was responsible only for military and not political affairs. He, however, accepted the Vietnamese appeal and reported it to the provisional Government of Khuang Apphaiwong.

Although Khuang was sympathetic to the Indo-Chinese nationalist cause, as he hoped that when they were victorious in the guerrilla war with France, Thailand would automatically get back the ceded provinces in Laos and Cambodia, he was strongly opposed the members of the military clique who were determined to co-operate with the French.

Moreover, the presence on Thai soil of the Indo-Chinese nationalists constituted a threat to rather than support for the dominant position in Thai politics of the military clique. The Indo-Chinese nationalists’ close connection with Pridi’ Free Thai group during and after the war gave cause for serious concern to the military leadership.

For example, there were rumors that Dr Nguyen Duc Qui, the President of the Vietnam Government Delegation to Thailand, would co-operate with Pridi and his followers in the latter’s attempts to return to power. These rumors were probably created by the French for the purpose of isolating the Viet Minh agents from the Thai regime.

Nguyen Duc Qui, however, dismissed such an allegations as unjustifiable, rejecting any collusion between the Vietnamese nationalists and the Free Thais, and giving assurance that the Vietnamese community in Thailand would not interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs.

Given its sense of danger, the military clique was provided with a special reasons for isolating itself from the Indo-Chinese nationalists. Accordingly, there was no longer indifference on the part of the Thai authorities to the activities of the Vietnamese and other refugees in Thailand; the police kept a watchful eye on their movements.

Despite Phibunsonggram’s limited co-operation with them at the expense of the Free Thais, the French needed even more co-operative measures from the Thai regime.

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (05)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (05)

In September 1948, a Thai military mission was invited to visit French Indo-China. The mission was headed by General Kacgsonggram, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who was also the head of the extremist military party. In an official announcement, the main aims of the missions were (1) to restore friendly relations between the two countries, (2) to co-operate with each other in suppressing robbery and banditry in the frontier areas, and (3) to maintain peace and order on the border of mutual benefit.

The French no doubt hoped that as a result of the visit the Thais would be willing to be more co-operative in curbing the activities of the Vietnamese and other Free Indo-Chinese elements in Thailand.

For the Thais, a growing fear of the Chinese Communists during 1948 was an additional motive inducing the Thai Government to send a goodwill mission to Saigon. The Thais feared that the whole of China would go Communist and that Thailand would be threatened with Communists externally as well as the danger from Chinese Communist residents in Thailand.

Their intention was therefore to improve relations with French Indo-China which the Thais now regarded as a buffer state in its entirety.

Free Thais’ opinion at home reacted unfavorably to this move and suspected that the Indo-Chinese authorities would try to persuade the Thai Government to adopt a more reactionary policy in dealing with the various “Free” Indo-Chinese elements, which had hitherto been openly unmolested on Thai soil and which enjoyed the private, if not the official sympathy, of the Thai authorities.

Despite this opposition at home the Thai military mission went to Saigon. During their week’s stay in Indo-China, the mission was received by senior French officials including the High Commissioner.

They were conducted on tour of inspections of naval, military and air bases, and were shown various demonstrations, including one by parachute troops. Entertainment was also lavish, and all activities were punctuated liberally “Champagnes de’shoneur.” The French hoped that, having been wined and dined in Saigon for a week, General Kachsonggram would perhaps become less likely in the future to encourage anti-French feeling.

Military co-operation on the frontier was also discussed with the object of preventing the Indo-Chinese resistance groups from taking refuge across the Thai border when pursued by French troops. There were also talks of a very general nature on possible measures against the Communist menace in South-East Asia.

In fact, the French invited General Kachsonggram to co-operate in suppressing those Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians who, if Communist led, were fighting for their independence. The French, in making this request, thought that they could get the same degree of co-operation from the Thais in their fight against the Viet Minh, as Great Britain had obtained from them in its fight against the Malayan Communists. The Thais seemed to be well aware of the difference in the two situations.

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (06)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (06)

General Kachsonggram, when invited by the French to co-operate in putting down these Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians, replied that while action would be taken in Thailand against refugees from Indo-China who violated Thai Laws, this was all he could promise. It was but natural that  “the people under the domination of another country” should struggle for freedom and the Thai Government could not intervene against them.

Kachsonggram’s ambiguous reply to the French authorities did not represent the view of Phibunsonggram. The latter wanted Thailand to co-operate fully with the French authorities. This pro-French policy of Phibunsonggram was an embarrassment to Kachsonggram and created a great deal of resentment among the Army. On October 1, 1948 Major General Net Khemayothin, Army Chief of General Staff who had accompanied Kachsonggram’s military mission to Saigon, organized a plot against Phibunsonggram. The government, however, discovered this so-called “Chief of General Staff Rebellion” and afterwards conducted a purge of the Army’s ranks.

Although Kachsonggram might have been the man behind this plot, he was so popular among the Thai people and in the Army that Phibunsonggram could not get rid of him until early 1950. That year Kachsonggram was forced by Phibunsonggram with the backing of the police force to leave the country and seek political asylum in Hong Kong.

After the ”Chief of General Staff Rebellion” was suppressed, the clear-cut Thai policy towards France and the Indo-Chinese nationalist movements was publicly indicated by the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In early December 1948, Pridi Deyabonge Devakul, the Foreign Minister,  in an interview with a French newspaper, expressed Thailand’s desire to be in political amity with, and a good neighbor to, France.

He made it clear that “…We have recently taken the decision to no longer tolerate our territory being used as a refuge for troublesome elements nor as a springboard for (Indo-Chinese nationalists) movement which conspire against our neighbor (France)…” From then on the Phibunsonggram put its policy into practice.

Phibunsonggram, in particular, declared his hostile attitude towards the Indo-Chinese nationalists. He accused them of using Thai territory as a base for active revolt against French colonial authorities across the borders. He publicly stated that he could no longer tolerate their staying in Thailand as they competed with local Thai labor in the border areas.

In November 1948, the first repressive action taken by the Phibunsonggram Administration against them was the imposition of immigration charges of 200 baht for each one residing in Thailand, despite the complaints of the 70,000 Vietnamese that ”poverty prevents them from being able to pay the immigration fee of 200 baht.” In the meantime, the Ministry of Interior instructed Provincial Commissioners that the refugees be asked to return to their territories in Indo-China because, “ the Franco-Vietnam War conditions that caused them to flee into Siam soon after the Pacific War now no longer apply.”

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (07)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (07)

In January 1949, as a result of the notice officially given by the French military authorities in Indo-China that they were due to begin a suppression campaign against nationalists in the Thailand-Indo-China border areas, Thai security authorities warned all provincial officers in the border zone to guard against any disturbances resulting from the French operations nearby. The Thai Government also issued an order that those refugees not engaged in political activities  be allowed to stay, while those engaged in organizing anti-French resistance within Thai territory be removed to Indo-China.

Yet, despite Thai co-operation with the French along the frontier they still allowed Viet Minh political organizations to exist in Thailand. These organizations included the Vietnam Government representative, the Vietnam News Service and the Vietnam Relief Association and probably the Vietnam Arms Purchasing Commissions. The Vietnamese held meetings overtly when they could get permission, but in secret when it was withheld, and sent money and arms across the border.

Throughout 1949 money was still being sent, although the increased vigilance of the Thai police and the military made the traffic in arms more difficult. At that time it would seem that the Thais were still  “sitting on the fence” waiting to see which way the wind might blow before acting decisively. This cautious policy, lasted until February 1950, when the Thai Government recognized the French-sponsored Governments in Indo-China.