Thailand and the Viet Minh League (04)

Thailand and the Viet Minh League (04)

The Vietnamese nationalists in Bangkok suffered first from this change of government. Their houses were searched and their stocks of weapons destined for indo-China seized. The Vietnamese had tried in vain to persuade the Thai military authorities that they would not use the weapons in hostilities against Thailand; instead they would use them to gain freedom and to throw off the French yoke.

As they had helped Thailand including the recruitment of Vietnamese into the Thai Army in the Franco-Thai conflict in 1940-41, they reminded Phibunsonggram of that episode. In reply, the latter, then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, tried to evade the issue by telling the Vietnamese that he was responsible only for military and not political affairs. He, however, accepted the Vietnamese appeal and reported it to the provisional Government of Khuang Apphaiwong.

Although Khuang was sympathetic to the Indo-Chinese nationalist cause, as he hoped that when they were victorious in the guerrilla war with France, Thailand would automatically get back the ceded provinces in Laos and Cambodia, he was strongly opposed the members of the military clique who were determined to co-operate with the French.

Moreover, the presence on Thai soil of the Indo-Chinese nationalists constituted a threat to rather than support for the dominant position in Thai politics of the military clique. The Indo-Chinese nationalists’ close connection with Pridi’ Free Thai group during and after the war gave cause for serious concern to the military leadership.

For example, there were rumors that Dr Nguyen Duc Qui, the President of the Vietnam Government Delegation to Thailand, would co-operate with Pridi and his followers in the latter’s attempts to return to power. These rumors were probably created by the French for the purpose of isolating the Viet Minh agents from the Thai regime.

Nguyen Duc Qui, however, dismissed such an allegations as unjustifiable, rejecting any collusion between the Vietnamese nationalists and the Free Thais, and giving assurance that the Vietnamese community in Thailand would not interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs.

Given its sense of danger, the military clique was provided with a special reasons for isolating itself from the Indo-Chinese nationalists. Accordingly, there was no longer indifference on the part of the Thai authorities to the activities of the Vietnamese and other refugees in Thailand; the police kept a watchful eye on their movements.

Despite Phibunsonggram’s limited co-operation with them at the expense of the Free Thais, the French needed even more co-operative measures from the Thai regime.